Egypt’s Strategy on the Nile: Active securitization Towards Active Delusion

Sagni T. and Zerihun A.

One can boldly argue that Ethiopia’s foreign policy orientation towards the Nile had not been active. Given the determinants of foreign policy ranging from the composition of foreign policy decision-making units to the contemporary balance of power configuration at the global or regional level, one can easily find as many variables as one wishes to justify and/or defend the ‘non-active’ Ethiopian foreign policy. However, the purpose of this note aims at analyzing the foreign policy course of actionEthiopia has followed so far and tries to suggest additional features, if need be, on Ethiopia’s strategy towards achieving its foreign policy objectives with respect to the Nile in general and the GERD in particular by also analyzing the foreign policy orientation of Egypt.

Egypt has intensified diplomatic warfare against GERD aiming at neutralizing many of perceived Ethiopia’s allies regarding the Nile water and resurrecting age-old fault lines to direct considerable pressure on Ethiopia. Meanwhile, Ethiopia has not been taking an active foreign policy course to justify and defend its legitimate GERD project.  Given Ethiopia’s passive and Egypt’s active foreign policy orientation towards the Nile in general and GERD in particular, it can be argued that Ethiopia and Egypt have been on the defensive and offensive disposition respectively.

Egypt’s Foreign Policy Objective towards the Nile River

Egyptian foreign policy orientation emanates from the very fact that their lifeline, the Nile River, stretches beyond their geographic boundary (Hassan and Rasheedy, 2007: 27). Taking into consideration that 95% of their population resides across the basin; the Nile River constitutes the cognitive behaviour of Egyptian foreign policy makers.

Generally, it can be argued that the prime objective of foreign policy from the Egyptian landmass is to secure the lion’s share from the Nile River using whichever alternative is on the table – whether it is the British or the Egyptians who articulated it. Their alternatives include complete control of the basin,cooperative diplomacy (Hassan and Rasheedy, 2007: 13), threat to use force, and undermining the sovereignty of riparian states especially Ethiopia. Be this as it may, securing the waters from potential threats has always been the center of their foreign policy and securitization its primary pillar.

1. a.      Securitizing the Nile Water – First Active Move

Taking the constructivist stand Buzan and Waever (2003: 70-71) state that ‘a security issue is a threat to the survival of a nation.’ Taking this stance, Egypt declared that interruption on the flow of water into the Aswan High Dam is an existential threat for Egypt. This seems valid if anyone considers the Egyptian situation one-sidedly. A country whose average rainfall is close to zero (Karyabwite and Rizzolio, 2000: 25 quoted in Hassan and Al Rasheedy, 2007: 28) and where almost 95% of the entire population resides in the basin (Karyabwite and Rizzolio, 2000: 33 quoted in Hassan and Al Rasheedy, 2007: 27) is believed to securitize the only source of life, the Nile River. On the other hand, assessing Egypt’s water use Swain (1997:11) argues that Agriculture, which takes 86% of the available water, accounts for only 14% of Egypt’s GDP and Egypt imports 50% of its food consumption annually. Therefore, based on Guitton’s data the securitization of the Nile River by Egypt is thoroughly a political process rather than that of survival. As Buzan and Waever (2003, 71) noted, the ‘constructive process’ of securitization is entirely political. Therefore, Egypt has taken the initiative to securitize leaving Ethiopia to reactively‘de-securitize’ issues regarding the Nile.

Be the securitization of the Nile River as it may, it is time to analyze how further securitizing actors would go to promote their interest. Securitizing actors utilizes peculiar measures to sponsor security because the survival factor implicates the ‘point of no return’ (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 72). Downstream countries have been taking peculiar measures since colonial times. The Great Britain, once the master of Egypt and the Sudan, signed series of treaties with Italia, Ethiopia and other colonial powers in the upstream to pursue its goal of ensuring the uninterrupted flow of the Nile River in to Egypt. This interest of the British is entirely derived from their interest in the cotton plantation along the banks of the Nile River. Following the British, Egypt’s consecutive governments continue this foreign policy orientation. This foreign policy objective, in post-colonial Egypt, has been pursued by aligning itself with its ‘claimed-natural ally’, the Sudan. The 1959 agreement can best be understood as the peculiar measure Egypt, as a securitizing actor, has taken to ensure its ‘security.’ Again, Egypt has taken an active role of signing treaties again forcing Ethiopia to move a defensive yet reactive role of re-writing this agreement by CFA as evidenced in the former`s proposal for the contested Article 14(b).

The practice of securitization of the Nile River by Egypt, who is anactive player in a policy of securitization of the Nile (Guitton, 2010), has forced Ethiopia to pursue its interest over the Nile River in a defensive and reactive manner. In this regard, the international media outlets had negatively presented GERD as it is a victim of sanctioned discourse of the net water receiver in the Nile-Egypt. For instance, Reuters’s reporter Barry Malone places a picture of a setting sun over Nile in Egypt with a description of “The sun sets over the river Nile in Cairo” in his April 18, 2011 article entitledEthiopia keeping Egypt in dark on Nile dam; The Economist on April 20, 2011 article tried to ridicule the Grand Renaissance Dam as A dam nuisance; in addition, Lester Brown on the New York wrote a controversial and preferential article entitled “when the River Nile Runs Dry” when he outrageously support the new wave of ‘Egyptian democracy’ at the expense of Ethiopian starvation. These articles, though rigid and limited, convey animportant message; whatever happened along the River Nile, theinternational community is made to think that the security of Egypt is in jeopardy. Therefore, according to ‘the first come – better served’ principle Egypt is taking the upper hand in the diplomatic battle as Ethiopia is stuck in a defensive and reactive foreign policy stance.

b.      The Cooperative Framework Agreement  (CFA)

Ethiopia’s foreign policy posture regarding the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) had been active and fruitful. Six, from twelve riparian nations, have signed the agreement so far. Among them Ethiopia ratified the agreement and Uganda is on the process of ratification –the remaining four signatories have not started to ratify and six riparian states have not yet signed the agreement. There is no place like the downstream Egypt where CFA echoed vibrantly. Throughout the process of negotiation of CFA, Egypt tried (but failed) to manipulate the term ‘water security’, an indistinct and non-legal concept in a completely legal paper (Zeleke, 2010), so as to obstruct the agreement from being signed disregarding the needs of the upper riparian countries.

Nevertheless, Egypt even after six countries signed the agreement has been striving to prevent the upstream countries realize CFA. It has once again started to pursue its ‘water security’ aggressively. Egypt has tried to use the financial strength of ‘renter-Gulf-states’ especially Saudi Arabia’s to repair its ties with and seek alliance from Sudan and South Sudan. In addition, most recently Egyptian delegate visited Uganda and Burundi most likely to persuade them not to ratify the CFA. In fact, this is part of its policy of divide and rule the Nile by any means possible. Again, this plunks Ethiopia in yet another defensive and reactive posture.

Moreover, the Egyptian foreign minister N. Fahmy also visited Senegal early November 2013. His ministry has also invited journalists from the Republic of South Africa and briefed them about the common rhetoric of securitization of the Nile. Once missing in Africa Egypt is trying its best to get back to the continent it abandoned for almost three decades. Once again, recent developments regarding the Nile (CFA and GERD) have forced them to reconsider Africa. It can be inferred from here that Egypt is yet trying to take advantages over Ethiopia over diplomatic front in the continent by the same old process of securitization of the Nile.

Conclusion

Ethiopia has always been forced to react to Egyptian initiative concerning the Nile River. As far as diplomatic front is concerned the past can easily be summarized as ‘not adequate’ given thesecuritization of the Nile River by Egypt is still the hegemonic idea concerning the river. Which will not solve the problem but let the Basin in a vicious-circle of arguments and counter-arguments, offensive and defensive strategies. The major, if not the only obstacle, had been Ethiopia’s reactive foreign policy orientation towards the Nile politics in general. Such passive and reactive orientation might have caused insignificant hitch before CFA and GERD. CFA and GERD have taken the hydropolitics of the Nile River in to a new level. These two projects are fertile grounds for fierce diplomatic confrontation for they disrupt the prevailing structure in the basin. Therefore, Ethiopia’s reactive foreign policy orientation must give way to the more proactive and active foreign policy orientation as evinced in the two developments-CFA and GERD.

Why Active and Proactive Foreign policy Now?

Active foreign policy is a key to win the diplomatic battle over GERD and CFA for the following two foremost reasons. Firstly, as it was observed earlier Ethiopia’s stance concerning CFA has shifted from active role to passive role as it is not pushing the ratification by the signatory states and its signing by the non-signatories. Egypt, despite its internal problem, has been insistent to curtail the growing prominence of CFA the basin. The only logical counter move is to engage aggressively to make sure CFA is signed and ratified by the Nile River riparian states.

Secondly, as it can be observed from the November 4th, 2013 meeting in Khartoum, it can be argued that Egypt was not trying to make something out of the meeting rather Egypt was simply trying to disrupt it for the following reasons. First, most of its delegation was composed of personalities who are new to the negotiation process. As a result they pull the negotiation process backward. Secondly, Egypt tried to incorporate new agenda for discussions disregarding the already agreed upon agenda. In addition, Egypt proposed that another international committee has to be formed with regulatory capacity. Egypt opted for another international panel for the following two main reasons. First, it is evident that Egyptians wanted to push the negotiation to a more political level; and such level is highly reliant on political considerations such as “securitization” to make their claim more appealing to the international community with the dictum they have been signing ‘Egypt is nothing but the Nile.’ Secondly, international experts might be for sale. These observations can lead any commentator towards the assertion that Egypt was in Khartoum to nullify the previous negotiations and to make further negotiations difficult. They are doing so just to buy some time and to reengage themselves in activities such as mounting pressure on Sudan so that it changes its position on GERD; to buy off NBI countries so that CFA becomes next to nothing; and to find a way to coerce the Ethiopian government reconsider the GERD project (from state-sponsored terrorism to possible military attack). Why is the interim government acting irresponsibly? It’s an interim government incapable of making permanent decisions especially vis-à-vis the Nile River. Consequently, nothing fruitful can be expected from negotiations with the interim government and the proposed December 2013 meeting will likely witness another commotion effort from the Egyptian delegates – once again as Merkeb Negash stated it earlier ‘the ball is in Egypt’s court’ and the world is watching closely!

 

References    

Brown, Lester R. 2011. When the Nile Runs Dry. The New York Times. June 1, 2011. Available at:http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/opinion/02Brown.html?_r=0

Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver. 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hassan, Hamdy A.; Rasheedy, Ahmad Al. 2007. The Nile river and Egyptian foreign policy interests.African Sociological Review. 11(1). Pp. 25-37.

Malone, Bary. 2011. Ethiopia keeping Egypt in dark on Nile dam. Reuters. Monday 18 April 2011. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/18/us-ethiopia-nile-idUSTRE7…

Swain, Ashok. (1997) Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt: The Nile River dispute. Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4. pp. 675-694.

The Economist. 2011. The Nile River: A Dam Nuisance. April 20th 2011. Available at:http://www.economist.com/node/18587195

Zeleke, Mekonnen. Dereje. 2010. “The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement Negotiations and the Adoption of a ‘Water Security’ Paradigm: Flight into Obscurity or a Logical Cul-de-sac?” In European Journal of International Law, vol. 21 (2), May 2010, 421 – 440.